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Abstract:  In this paper, we address the often contentious debate over state and local recycling 
policy by carefully estimating the social net benefit of curbside recycling.  Benefits are estimated 
using household survey data from over 4,000 households across 40 western U.S. cities.  We 
calibrate household willingness-to-pay for hypothetical bias using an innovative experimental 
design that contrasts stated and revealed preferences.  Cost estimates are compiled from previous 
studies by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and the Institute for Local Self Reliance, 
and from in-depth interviews with recycling coordinators in our sampled cities.  Across our 
sample of cities, we find that the estimated mean social net benefit of curbside recycling is 
almost exactly zero.  On a city-by-city basis, however, our social net-benefit analysis often 
makes clear predictions about whether a curbside recycling program is an efficient use of 
resources.  Surprisingly, several curbside recycling programs in our sample appear to be 
inefficient.    
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1. Introduction 
One of society’s greatest challenges is determining optimal allocations for environmental 
goods, such as old-growth forests, wetlands, spotted owls, wolf habitat, clean air, etc.  The 
primary difficulty with this type of problem is accurately measuring the social benefits accruing 
from the provision of these goods.  Due to the potential for free-riding behavior and the absence 
of well-developed markets, it is often necessary to estimate the benefits through non-market 
valuation methods, such as contingent valuation.   
In this paper, we focus on one such environmental good – curbside recycling.  Recycling is 
typically thought to benefit the environment by diverting solid waste from landfills, which can 
pollute groundwater, produce airborne pollutants, and compete for open space [U.S. EPA, 1992].  
However, recycling programs also require households to clean, sort, store and deliver 
recyclables.  Furthermore, curbside recycling programs (CRPs) divert resources from other 
public services such as education, highway maintenance, welfare programs, etc.  Our goal in this 
paper is to provide a comprehensive measure of the social net benefit of curbside recycling, in 
order to help answer the often contentious question:  “Should we be recycling?” 
To date, answers to this question have been contentious and, in some cases contradictory.  
Take, for example, New York City’s decision in the summer of 2002 to temporarily suspend 
collection of plastics and glass [Johnson, 2002].  Less than two years later, however, the city 
completely reversed its decision, choosing instead to invest $20 million in a new Brooklyn 
waterfront recycling plant [Urbina, 2004].  The primary basis for both the initial decision to 
suspend recycling and the subsequent reversal of that decision was cost effectiveness.  While 
cost effectiveness may be an understandable criterion for municipalities that operate under tight 
fiscal budgets and lack reliable estimates of the social benefits of recycling, we are left to wonder 
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whether the city’s policymakers have made socially efficient decisions by failing to assess both 
the social costs and benefits of curbside recycling.1 
New York City is not alone.  Recent trends suggest that recycling rates are falling 
nationwide, provoking many communities to reconsider whether they should continue providing 
curbside recycling.  In its most recent annual report, “State of Garbage in America”, Biocycle 
magazine finds that although the per-capita generation of solid waste continues to grow 
nationwide, the overall recycling rate is down from 33 percent in 1999 to 26.7 percent in 2002 
and the number of CRPs is similarly down from 9,709 to 8,875 [Kaufman, et al., 2004].  Cities 
big and small have either dropped their CRPs completely or are scaling them back to meet 
budget shortfalls [Seibert, 2002].  Also, several cities that have traditionally provided curbside 
recycling without directly charging for the service are now considering levying a household fee 
[Ibid].  Unfortunately, these decisions are being made similarly to New York City’s.  They are 
based exclusively on the criterion of cost effectiveness, rather than on the social net benefits of 
curbside recycling.    
This paper represents a first attempt at establishing a sound economic basis for making such 
public policy decisions by estimating both the benefits and costs of curbside recycling for a wide 
range of communities.2  One of our main contributions is the innovative way in which we use the 
contingent valuation method (CVM) to estimate willingness-to-pay (WTP) for CRPs.  The 
innovation stems from a common criticism of previous CVM studies – that respondents tend to 
                                                            
1 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that social efficiency is not the only issue driving the debate 
about recycling.  Questions related to the moral and ethical obligations of recycling are also likely at play. 
 
2 Previous studies have also looked at the net benefits of curbside recycling (e.g., Hanley and Slark, 1994; SWANA, 
1995; Kinnaman, 2000).  However, these studies use more of a case-study approach focusing on individual 
communities.  We consider our study, which covers a wide variety of communities and CRPs, to be a complement to 
and extension of these existing case studies.  In particular, our study enables inference to a wider population of 
CRPs. 
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overstate their true WTP due to the hypothetical nature of the good.  Unlike these previous 
studies, we are able to estimate the magnitude of the potential hypothetical bias in our WTP data 
by contrasting stated-preference information (from CVM) with revealed-preference information 
(from actual decisions made by households in communities with voluntary CRPs).3  Using this 
estimate of hypothetical bias, we then calibrate the corresponding WTP estimates to the 
decisions made by households in a real market setting.4  To our knowledge, this is the first time 
that stated- and revealed-preference information from the same dataset has been used to directly 
estimate hypothetical bias in WTP and subsequently calibrate the welfare estimates.5   
On the cost side, we utilize information from a wide array of communities to obtain an 
estimated per-household economic cost of providing curbside recycling services.  In calculating 
the costs of curbside recycling, we include both explicit variable and fixed costs, as well as the 
opportunity costs associated with diverting public resources away from their next most 
productive use. 
Across our sample of cities, we find that the estimated mean social net benefit of curbside 
recycling is almost exactly zero.  However, on a city-by-city basis, our analysis often makes 
clear predictions about whether a CRP is an efficient use of resources.  The results from our 
econometric and calibration exercise can also be used as a practical tool by local policy makers 
to obtain estimates of their community’s WTP for curbside recycling.  This is accomplished by 
                                                            
3 “Voluntary” CRPs require households to pay only if they have signed up for the program while “mandatory” CRPs 
require all households to pay, irrespective of whether they have signed up or not. 
 
4 We use CVM to estimate benefits (rather than derive such measures using market prices and aggregate 
participation levels) because much of the data from established markets for voluntary curbside recycling are 
proprietary and also would not generally include information at the household level. 
 
5 Cameron [1992], Adamowicz, et al. [1994], Huang, et al. [1997], and Whitehead, et al. [2000] combine stated and 
revealed preference data to enhance the efficiency of their welfare estimates.  Cummings and Taylor [1999] use 
responses from stated- and revealed-preference laboratory experiments to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical 
bias in students’ valuations of a series of public goods. 
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substituting the relevant community and socio-demographic characteristics into the right-hand-
side of our econometric equation.  The resulting estimate of household benefits can then be 
weighed against the economic costs to determine whether establishing or maintaining a CRP is 
socially efficient. 
The next section presents a simple theoretical framework that describes the management of 
solid waste at the household and community levels.  This framework guides our ensuing 
empirical analysis.  In section three, we introduce the data sources used in developing measures 
of economic costs and benefits.  In section four, we present our econometric model for 
estimating WTP, including the methods used to mitigate hypothetical bias, and discuss our 
empirical results.  In section five, we discuss the policy implications of our empirical findings 
and suggest some possible avenues for future research. 
 
2. Theoretical Model 
Our model involves an equilibrium relationship between households and a community 
planner, whereby households make utility-maximizing decisions in response to the planner’s 
policies and the planner sets public policy to maximize the well-being of the households.  As 
shown in the Appendix, household i, i = 1,…,n, is assumed to maximize an Andreoni (1990) 
impure-public-good utility function by choosing recycling effort subject to a budget constraint.6  
This creates a potential externality since households have no apparent incentive to fully 
internalize the marginal effect of their private recycling effort on the aggregate amount of 
recyclable material generated at the community level.7 
                                                            
6 The appendix can be found at www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/. 
 
7 See Fullerton and Wu [1998] and Kinnaman and Fullerton [2000] for alternative general equilibrium models of 
recycling and other “green policies” at the household level. 
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The impure-public-good assumption is supported by our survey results showing that both 
ethics (i.e., “an ethical duty to help the environment”) and the potential generation of income 
(through the sale of recyclable material to governmental or private entities) motivate many of the 
sampled households to recycle.  These two motivations suggest that households are indeed 
motivated by what Andreoni has labeled the “egoistic” component of preferences.  The 
“altruistic” component of preferences is then represented by the potential for households to at 
least partially internalize the effect of their private recycling effort on the community’s aggregate 
amount of recycling.8  
WTP for curbside recycling is ultimately derived by subtracting the household’s minimum 
expenditure given that it participates in the CRP from its minimum expenditure given that it does 
not.  In other words, WTPi is defined by the amount of income household i would willingly 
forego so as to participate in a CRP and maintain its original (pre-CRP) utility level.  The 
household’s WTP for curbside recycling may be negative if the disutility of foregone leisure is 
sufficiently large relative to the utility gained from recycling.   
The community planner is responsible for managing municipal solid waste G by (i) selecting 
a type of CRP indexed by j ∈ {N,M,V}, where N, M and V refer to no, mandatory and  
voluntary curbside recycling respectively; and (ii) selecting the household curbside recycling 
fee, τ .  The planner is assumed to face a balanced-budget constraint9  
                                                            
8 For an alternative interpretation of altruism and its effect on the efficient distribution of public goods, see 
Bergstrom [1982], Jones-Lee [1991,1992], and Flores [2002]. 
 
9 We recognize that economic efficiency requires that households be serviced up to the point where price equals 
marginal, rather than average, costs.  We have chosen to focus on balance-budget pricing, however, for two reasons.  
First, municipal CRPs are commonly expected to be self-sustaining and thus not dip continuously into general tax 
revenues to cover costs (based on our own personal interviews of community recycling coordinators and private 
contractors for this study).  Note that for mandatory programs, where all households are required to pay for the 
service, the CRP fee is simply a de facto form of lump-sum taxation and the natural fee is the one causing revenues 
to just match total costs.  Second, we observe several communities without mandated recycling goals choosing 
mandatory CRPs.  Since we know there are households with WTP less than marginal costs, this suggests an 
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j jn C(n , j)τ =                                          (1) 
where nj represents the number of participants for CRP type j and C is the total economic cost of 
providing curbside recycling.  The number of participants are nN = 0, nM = n, and nV = n*, where 
n is the number of households participating in the mandatory CRP and n* is defined by the 
number of households that satisfy WTPi ≥ τ under a voluntary program.  C includes both explicit 
fixed and variable components, as well as the implicit costs associated with the foregone use of 
resources allocated toward a CRP (further discussion of these costs is provided in the next 
section).  Based on interviews with community recycling coordinators and private contractors 
(discussed further in Section 3), we also assume that marginal cost (MC) is positive and constant 
across nj.  Thus, average total cost (ATC) is asymptotically coincident with MC. 
The community planner then uses this benefit and cost information, along with budget-
balance condition (1), to simultaneously determine whether to establish a CRP, and if so, which 
type and at what fee level.  We begin by stating the condition required for the community 
planner to offer a CRP of either type M or V.  
 
CRP Condition I.  Given (1) and WTPi, the community planner will offer a CRP of either 
type M or V, if and only if 
Mn
ii 1
WTP C(n,M) WTP ATC(n,M)
=
≥ ⇒ ≥∑ or 
Vn* *
ii 1
WTP C(n ,V) WTP ATC(n ,V)∗
=
≥ ⇒ ≥∑ , where
M
WTP and
V
WTP denote the mean 
WTP for mandatory and voluntary communities, respectively.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
objective other than economic efficiency (e.g., a balanced-budget criterion).   Nevertheless, implementing a 
mandatory program in cases where the average household’s net benefit is positive is suggestive of a potential Pareto 
improvement (with appropriate inter-household transfers), while implementing a voluntary program suggests an 
actual Pareto improvement.  We thank an anonymous reviewer for this last observation. 
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In other words, the community planner will offer a CRP of either type M or V if the mean 
WTP exceeds the ATC (evaluated at the number of participating households) for that program 
type.  Figure 1 depicts the geometry for CRP Condition I.  The aggregate marginal surplus (AMS) 
curve, drawn linear for simplification, depicts the change in aggregate WTP as the number of 
households increases, beginning with the household with the largest WTP and ending with the 
household whose WTP is lowest. 
The household fee for the voluntary program, τV, is determined by budget balance at the 
intersection between the AMS and ATC curves, which also determines the number of 
participating households, n*, and the total net community surplus, area A.  In this case, the 
voluntary program passes CRP Condition I.  A mandatory program charges a household fee of τM, 
which by the budget-balance condition is consistent with n participating households.  The 
mandatory program also passes CRP Condition I if area A+B+C exceeds area F+G +H.  
Conversely, both voluntary and mandatory programs would fail CRP Condition I if, for example, 
the AMS curve lied everywhere beneath the ATC curve.  In this case, no τ could be found to 
satisfy (1), and thus a CRP of neither type would be offered. 
If CRP Condition I is satisfied, the community planner then determines which type of 
program to offer.  The following condition gives the condition required for choosing a voluntary 
or mandatory CRP.   
 
CRP Condition II.  Assume CRP Condition I is satisfied.  The community planner chooses a 
voluntary (mandatory) CRP if 
V *WTP ATC(n ,V)−  is greater (less) than 
M
WTP ATC(n,M)−  with corresponding household fee τV (τM) satisfying (1).   
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In other words, a voluntary program is chosen over a mandatory program whenever the 
household fees and participation levels for the two programs are such that the net community 
surplus from the voluntary program is greater than that from the mandatory program. 
Figure 1 also depicts the geometry for CRP Condition II.  Moving from a voluntary to a 
mandatory CRP, n* households obtain a net-surplus increase of area B, while n – n* households 
obtain a net-surplus change of area C – F – G – H.  Therefore, if area B + C – F – G – H > 0, a 
mandatory program is chosen under CRP Condition II with fee τM; otherwise a voluntary 
program is chosen with fee τV.  As shown in Figure 1, the probability that a voluntary CRP is 
chosen increases, all else equal, as the ATC curve becomes flatter.  A flatter ATC curve, in turn, 
is consistent with a relatively low fixed-to-variable cost ratio.  Alternatively, mandatory CRPs 
have a greater probability of being chosen at higher fixed-to-variable cost ratios.   
In closing, our joint household-community planner model makes clear predictions about the 
social efficiency of various recycling options and enables us to predict which types of recycling 
programs should be observed in the different communities in our sample.  Before making these 
predictions, however, we first introduce the data sources used to estimate the costs and benefits 
of the various CRPs sampled from our population. 
 
3.  Cost and Benefit Data  
3.1. Cost Data 
Our CRP cost data was obtained from two sources:  (i) interviews with community recycling 
coordinators and private contractors located in our study area (discussed further in Section 3.2), 
and (ii) published studies by the Institute for Local Self-Reliance (ILSR) [1991] and Franklin 
Associates, Ltd [1997].  The ILSR study provides detailed cost information for Seattle, WA and 
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West Linn, OR, while the Franklin Associates study provides information for Olathe, KS.  From 
the recycling coordinators and private contractors, we obtained cost information for eight cities – 
seven communities in our sample and Portland, OR.10  This information is shown in Table 1. 
 The costs are based on explicit fixed and variable expenses for collection and processing 
incurred during the most recent year available.  They are reported on a per-household per-month 
basis in order to be directly comparable with our benefit information.11  The costs have also been 
adjusted for cost-of-living differences across communities [MSN, 2003], and in the case of 
Seattle, West Linn, and Olathe appropriate adjustments for inflation have been made using the 
consumer price index [Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2003].  In addition to the CRP costs, Table 1 
also includes information on the number of participating households per year, percentage of the 
community’s population participating, as well as indicators for whether the CRP is mandatory 
and whether household sorting of recyclables is required. 
 Several observations can be made from the information provided in Table 1.  To begin, the 
estimated mean monthly cost per household across the eleven communities equals $2.93, with a 
coefficient of variation of 33 percent, implying a fairly tight distribution of cost estimates around 
the mean.  Second, because each CRP in our sample is different in terms of items collected, 
collection frequency, whether it is a mandatory or voluntary program, degree of sorting required, 
etc., we are unable to identify a single underlying ATC curve.  As a result, the numbers from 
Table 1 likely represent distinct points along several different ATC curves, rather than points 
                                                            
10 Cost information was unavailable for many of our sampled communities because it does not exist, cannot be 
extracted from overall waste-disposal cost information, or is proprietary. 
 
11 Costs are reported as an average cost over the lifetime of the program.  This reflects the fact that recycling 
coordinators and contractors are generally required to report on an annual basis and that CRPs are generally 
associated with relatively long planning horizons (e.g., 10-20 years) over which up-front capital costs are spread.  As 
a result, we do not attempt to calculate net present value estimates based on the specific periods in which the costs 
are incurred.  Rather, we presume that the monthly cost estimates provided by the recycling coordinators accurately 
reflect what a community can expect to incur during any given month of any given year. 
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along a single curve.  Lastly, there seems to be a weak relationship between costs and whether 
the CRP is mandatory or voluntary.  Five of the six least-costly CRPs are voluntary.  This cost 
differential is apparently due to unobservable cost efficiencies rather than economies-of-scale 
effects.12   
 
3.2. Survey Data and Design 
 Turning to the benefit data, we conducted a random-digit dialed telephone survey regarding 
recycling behavior during the winter of 2002 to over 4,000 households in 40 western U.S. cities 
with populations over 50,000.13  We chose an approximately even three-way split between 
communities with a voluntary, a mandatory and no CRP.  We purposefully over-sampled 
households in communities with voluntary CRPs to allow for the detection of any hypothetical 
bias in the data.  To supplement the household data, we also conducted a telephone survey of the 
recycling coordinators (i.e., the public and private officials responsible for recycling services) in 
each of the 40 cities in order to provide specific information on the attributes and history of 
recycling in their respective communities.   
 
                                                            
12 Unobservable cost efficiencies may be related to the facts that (i) Seattle and West Linn were included in the 
ILSR [1991] study of the nation's most efficient CRPs, and (ii) recycling coordinators for the cities of Tempe, Fargo, 
Orem, and Portland were able to provide relatively detailed information about their respective programs.  These 
facts suggest that these six programs may be more efficiently managed than the average program in our sample. 
 
13 Due to budget limitations, our population does not include the eastern U.S.  The survey was administered by the 
survey research laboratory at Washington State University.  The response and cooperation rates were 27 percent and 
49 percent, respectively.  The survey instrument, a list of the 40 cities in our sample, and information on the 
calculation of the response and cooperation rates are available at 
www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/datareport.pdf. 
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4. Econometric Methodology and WTP Estimates  
 In this section, we discuss (i) the double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) model used 
to obtain our welfare estimates, (ii) the estimation results for overall WTP, (iii) the identification 
and estimation of hypothetical bias across the different program types (i.e., M, V, and N), and 
(iv) the calibration of the mean WTP estimates for a select group of cities. 
 
4.1. Econometric Model 
 Our econometric approach follows Cameron and James [1987].  WTP questions are set in the 
DBDC format to elicit a household’s WTP through a sequence of dichotomous-choice 
questions.14  The first question is:  “Would you be willing to pay $ν for the service?”  The 
opening bid ν is chosen randomly from a set of predetermined values.15   Based on her response 
to the opening bid, the respondent is then asked a similar follow-up question, but with a larger 
bid value, 2ν, if she answered “yes” (i.e., she is willing to pay at least ν for the service) or a 
smaller bid, 0.5ν, if she answered “no” (i.e., she is unwilling to pay ν for the service).  
 Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up questions, the respondent’s latent 
WTP may be placed in one of four regions:  (-∞,0.5ν), (0.5ν, ν), (ν, 2ν) or (2ν, ∞).  Unlike other 
CVM studies, we follow up with a third valuation question for those who respond “no” to the 
first two valuation questions:  “Would you be willing to use the service if it were free of 
charge?”  Previous experience with household recycling surveys suggests that some households 
have negative WTP values, or in other words need to be paid to participate in a CRP [Haab and 
                                                            
14 The issue of optimal bid design is beyond the scope of this paper.  For further discussion on bid design see 
Kanninen [1995] and Cameron, et al. [2002]. 
 
15 The opening bids are chosen with equal probabilities from the set of integers two through 10.  This set 
encompasses the range of household fees charged by the communities in our sample.  As with the CRP cost data, the 
bids are adjusted so that our estimates of social net benefits accurately reflect real differences in cost-of-living across 
the communities in our sample.  
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McConnell, 1997; Aadland and Caplan, 2003].  As a result, our survey generates five rather than 
four valuation regions with (-∞,0.5ν) being replaced by (-∞, 0) and (0, 0.5ν).16  
Households currently participating in their community’s CRP were asked to value their 
existing program, while those households located in a community without a CRP were described 
the following hypothetical program,17 
“……please imagine that you could have a curbside-recycling service that regularly 
collects aluminum cans, cardboard, glass, paper, plastic, and tin cans.  Your household 
would/would not need to sort your recyclables into separate bins and would be required to 
pay a fee for the recycling service, in addition to your current monthly garbage collection 
fee.  Now we are going to ask you some questions about your household's willingness to pay 
for this type of curbside recycling service.” 
 
This description was developed with input from the recycling coordinators.  According to the 
coordinators, the primary factor distinguishing one CRP from another at the household level is 
the degree to which the household is required to sort its recyclable material, not the specific 
materials which are ultimately collected.  By varying this description randomly across 
households – based on whether the household “would” or “would not” need to sort their 
recyclables – we are therefore able to make direct comparisons between WTP responses elicited 
for this hypothetical CRP and responses elicited for existing voluntary and mandatory CRPs.  
These responses, in turn, enable us to measure the magnitude of hypothetical bias in WTP 
estimates (discussed at length in Section 4.3).18 
                                                            
16 Some respondents answered “Don’t Know” to one or more of the valuation questions.  For these households, their 
unknown WTP does not fit into one of the five categories, but instead overlaps one or more of the intervals.  For 
example, if a respondent answered “Don’t Know” to whether they would be willing to pay $ν and “Yes” to whether 
they would be willing to pay $0.5ν, we assume that their unknown WTP falls in the region (0.5ν, ∞).  The likelihood 
function is adjusted accordingly.  
 
17 Households located in communities with an existing CRP, and who know that the CRP exists, but who have 
chosen not to participate in the program were asked to value their community's existing program.  Households 
located in communities with an existing CRP, but who are unaware that the program exists, were asked to value the 
hypothetical program described in quotations below. 
 
18 For further information on our survey design see Aadland and Caplan [2005].  A copy of the survey instrument is 
available at www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle. 
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Turning to our econometric model, we specify a reduced-form version of WTPi, where the 
vector of explanatory variables Xi includes a host of household- and community-specific 
characteristics.  A normally distributed random error term εi is added to capture the portion of 
WTPi unexplained by Xi, implying 
i i iWTP = +εXβ ,                                 (2) 
where β  is a vector of coefficients.  The variance of the error terms is assumed to follow  
 2i iexp( )σ = Z γ ,                            (3) 
where Zi is a vector of variables and γ  is a vector of parameters.  Using (2) and (3), we then form 
and maximize the log likelihood function (see Aadland and Caplan [2003] for additional details 
on the specification of the probabilities and likelihood function).  The definitions of the 
explanatory variables used in equations (2) and (3), along with their sample means, are provided 
in Table 2. 
 
4.2. Econometric Results 
 In columns two and three of Table 3, we report our DBDC estimates across all (N = 4012) 
households in our sample.  First, note that the estimated WTP, averaged across cities, is $5.61 
per month.19  This estimate is larger than those reported in Aadland and Caplan [1999] and Tiller 
et al. [1997]; approximately the same as in Lake et al. [1996], Caplan and Grijalva [2003], and 
                                                            
19We have also tested for possible incentive incompatibility and starting-point bias using an approach originally 
suggested by Whitehead [2002] and later modified by Aadland and Caplan [2004].  We find evidence of starting-
point bias but no incentive incompatibility.  The mean WTP estimates for the two models (one controlling for 
starting-point bias and incentive incompatibility and one not) are very similar.  As a result, we report the results 
from the latter model. The results from the former model are available from the authors upon request.   
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Caplan et al. [2003]; but smaller than those in Aadland and Caplan [2003], Kinnaman [2000], 
and Jakus et al. [1996].20 
 Second, we find several individual- and community-specific characteristics that are 
significantly related to WTP for curbside recycling.  To highlight a few, those willing to pay the 
most are (a) young; (b) female; (c) highly educated; (d) motivated to recycle because of an 
ethical duty to help the environment; (e) members of an environmental organization; and 
(f) rated their current CRP as good or excellent.  Many of these effects are similar to those found 
in the previously cited literature.  The likelihood ratio test indicates that a significant amount of 
the variation in WTP being explained by household, community, and program attributes.   
 Third, we test for heteroscedasticity using (3).  By construction of the bid design, BID is 
systematically related to the variance of the latent WTP errors.  Recall that the opening bids are 
even integers between two and 10, with subsequent bids equal to either half or twice the opening 
amount.  Therefore, the bid design generates larger WTP intervals (and thus more uncertainty 
regarding the true WTP) for higher opening bids.  As expected, the coefficient on BID is positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.     
 
4.3. Calibrating WTP for Hypothetical Bias 
 The potential for hypothetical bias arises whenever people are asked to provide a maximum 
amount they are willing to pay for a good or service, even though they will not have to actually 
pay for it [e.g., Hanemann, 1994; Diamond and Hausman, 1994].  We estimate the magnitude of 
the bias in each of our community types – voluntary, mandatory and no CRP – and calibrate the 
mean WTP estimates accordingly.  In CVM it is typically not possible to estimate the magnitude 
                                                            
20 Tiller et al. [1997] and Jakus et al. [1996] are concerned with dropoff (as opposed to curbside) recycling 
programs. 
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of hypothetical bias because the good under question is not typically traded in an established 
market.  Even if the good is traded in an established market, one needs sufficient variation in the 
price of both the hypothetical and actual goods. With this in mind, our experiment was designed 
to include two different groups (one making stated decisions and the other making revealed 
decisions) and price variation across both hypothetical and actual CRPs.  This feature of our data 
enables us to estimate the magnitude of hypothetical bias for each of our community types.  We 
begin with voluntary CRP communities. 
  
4.3.1. Estimating Hypothetical Bias:  Communities with Voluntary CRPs 
 We first extract two non-overlapping subsamples of households from the dataset:  (i) 
households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that made a hypothetical decision 
about whether to participate in their existing CRP at a randomly assigned initial bid and (ii) 
households residing in communities with voluntary CRPs that have made an actual decision 
about whether to participate in their existing CRP.  Households in the second subsample (N = 
538) have revealed their preferences for curbside recycling, while households in the first 
subsample (N = 630) are simply stating their preferences for curbside recycling.  The subsample 
of stated-preference households was restricted to those whose initial (cost-of-living adjusted) 
bids were between $1.30 and $4.94 per month in order to be directly comparable with the 
existing fees faced by the revealed-preference households. 
 Next, we pool these two groups together and estimate a probit model for the decision of 
whether to participate in a voluntary CRP, controlling for a host of household, program, and 
community attributes.  We also allow the error variances to differ according to whether 
households are stating or revealing their preferences [Adamowicz et al., 1994].  Our null 
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hypothesis of no hypothetical bias is tested by observing the statistical significance of the 
coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation decision is hypothetical or real.  
If this coefficient is positive and statistically significant, we conclude that the typical household 
in a community with a voluntary CRP will, all else equal, tend to overstate their WTP for 
curbside recycling by the value of the coefficient.  The estimation results for this model, shown 
in columns four and five of Table 3, indicate that hypothetical bias for households in voluntary 
CRP communities is $2.30 per month.21   
 
4.3.2. Estimating Hypothetical Bias:  Communities with a Mandatory or No CRP  
 Next, we estimate hypothetical bias for households residing in communities with either a 
mandatory or no CRP, using methods similar to those described above.  In this case, the 
revealed-preference group includes all households residing in voluntary CRP communities with 
existing (cost-of-living-adjusted) fees between $1.30 and $4.94 per month and that are aware of 
the program’s existence, irrespective of the initial bid that they received (N = 994).22   
 There are two stated-preference groups in this case – those making hypothetical decisions 
about their mandatory CRP (N = 332) and those in communities without a CRP who are deciding 
about a hypothetical CRP described in the survey (N = 788).  We then pool all three groups – the 
revealed-preference voluntary CRP group, the mandatory CRP group, and the hypothetical CRP 
group – and estimate a probit model to predict whether a household participates in a CRP.  As 
before, we control for a wide variety of household, program and community attributes, and we 
allow error variances to differ by CRP type and whether the households are stating or revealing 
                                                            
21 For more details about this method of detecting and estimating the magnitude of hypothetical bias see Aadland 
and Caplan [2005]. 
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their preferences.  Two variables of most interest are the binary ones for whether the stated-
preference households are located in a community with either a mandatory or no CRP.  If the 
coefficients on these dummy variables are positive and statistically significant, we interpret this 
as evidence of positive hypothetical bias.  In other words, when faced with the decision of 
whether to sign up for a CRP, all else equal, households located in a mandatory or no CRP 
community that are making a hypothetical decision are more likely to do so (and consequently 
have a higher latent WTP) than those making an actual decision. 
 The results from this experiment, shown in columns six and seven of Table 3, indicate that 
hypothetical bias among households in mandatory and no CRP communities is $2.72 and $2.96 
per month, respectively.  As anticipated, the bias estimate for the typical household in a 
mandatory CRP community is lower (albeit slightly) than that for the no-CRP community, and 
both of these estimates are higher than that for the typical household in a voluntary CRP 
community.  This ordering suggests that the experience associated with voluntarily signing up 
for and/or using a CRP enables households to more accurately determine their true WTP.    
 
4.3.3. Calibrated WTP 
Using the hypothetical bias estimates from the previous two sections, we can adjust the mean 
WTP estimates, conditional on whether the household resides in a voluntary, mandatory, or no 
CRP community.  Also, using city-level U.S. Census Bureau data [2000] we are able to adjust 
the estimates to better represent population demographics.  Making adjustments for hypothetical 
bias and sampling error, we find that the average calibrated WTP value across the 40 
communities in our sample is $2.97 (see bottom of Table 3).  Table 4 provides additional details 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
22 We estimate hypothetical bias for the mandatory and no CRP households separately from the bias in the voluntary 
CRP households because the revealed-preference group in this section is larger than that in Section 4.3.1.  
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on the calibration process for the nine cities in our sample with available cost data and three 
randomly selected non-CRP cities.  In terms of estimated WTP, these 12 cities are representative 
of our sample of 40 cities and highlight the diversity across communities.  It is interesting to note 
that the estimated average monthly benefits per household from curbside recycling range from a 
high of over $5 in Tempe, AZ to a low of $1.40 in Newport Beach, CA. 
 
5. Policy Analysis and Conclusions 
 Remarkably, by comparing our mean calibrated WTP and cost estimates, we conclude that 
the social net benefit of curbside recycling is almost exactly zero.  As a result, to determine 
whether it is an efficient use of society’s resources, we need to evaluate curbside recycling on a 
city-by-city basis.      
 In Table 5, we take a closer look at the 12 communities included in Table 4.  Calibrated WTP 
values from Table 4 and per-household costs from Table 1 are provided in columns 2 and 3.  
Column 4 presents the corresponding social net benefits of curbside recycling, which vary 
greatly across the 12 communities.  For example, monthly net benefits in Tempe, AZ are $3.50 
per household, while in Palo Alto, CA they are -$2.85.  At their current populations and rates of 
CRP participation, this amounts to an annualized net benefit gain of $1.5 million in Tempe and 
an annualized net benefit loss in Palo Alto of $1.0 million. 
To shed some light on the variation in community net benefits noted above, we dig deeper 
into the two communities located on opposite ends of the net-benefit spectrum – Tempe, AZ 
(high end) and Palo Alto, CA (low end).  As indicated by the information contained in columns 
two and three of Table 5, the net-benefit difference between these two communities is due to 
differences in both the costs and benefits of curbside recycling.  On the benefits side, Tempe has 
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a nearly $3 higher adjusted benefit per household than Palo Alto.  The majority of this difference 
is unexplained variation captured by our city dummy variable, while the remainder appears to be 
due to the fact that, all else equal, Tempe has a younger population, higher employment rate, and 
respondents were less likely to give refusals on the first call attempt.23  
Although we can only conjecture on what may be driving the unexplained difference in WTP 
across the two communities, one possibility is the residents’ perceptions regarding landfill 
constraints.  For example, Tempe is more actively informing residents of landfill issues than is 
Palo Alto.  The Tempe Public Works Department (2006) writes on their website:  “One thing is 
certain, in the next few years Tempe’s residents and businesses will need to get involved in 
recycling if we are to solve the municipal solid waste problem.”  This, in turn, could help to raise 
the value of alternatives to landfilling waste (such as curbside or dropoff recycling) for the 
typical Tempe resident.24 
On the cost side, Palo Alto’s CRP costs approximately $3.50 more per household to operate 
than Tempe’s program.  The higher costs for Palo Alto appear to be driven by additional labor 
expense (due to the use of multiple bins rather than a single, automated co-mingled container) 
and relatively weaker enforcement of recycling standards (which may ultimately impact the 
quality of the recyclables collected).  The problem with additional labor expense was noted by 
Brown, Vence, and Associates, Inc.(2001) in their final report to the Palo Alto Public Works 
Department, which suggested that the city’s recycling collection process was inefficient (pages 
2-9 and 2-10).  Palo Alto subsequently switched from separate bin collection to their current co-
mingled system, shortly after we completed our survey in the winter of 2002.  To the contrary, 
                                                            
23 The community dummy variables for Tempe and Palo Alto (not shown in Table 3) account for $2.15, or more 
than two-thirds of the total difference in WTP across these two cities.   
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Tempe’s decade-old approach of dividing the collection and processing components of its co-
mingled system between the city and a private company appears to have significantly reduced 
the costs associated with both components.   
 The last two columns of Table 5 compare existing CRPs with our theoretical/empirical 
predictions.  The column entitled “CRP Predictions” shows that five of the 12 communities 
satisfy CRP Condition I (i.e., social net benefits of curbside recycling are positive).  Of these 
five, two communities have mandatory CRPs (Tempe, AZ and Longmont, CO), while the 
remaining three have voluntary CRPs.  CRP Condition II predicts that Tempe and Longmont 
may have mandatory CRPs because of high fixed-to-variable cost ratios (relative to Orem, 
Wichita and Fargo).  Unfortunately, we cannot test this hypothesis since we were unable to 
obtain a breakdown of the fixed and variable cost information from the recycling coordinators in 
Tempe and Longmont.  
 Of the seven communities that we predict should not have a CRP, three (Abilene, Peoria and 
Inglewood) represent correct predictions and four (Escondido, Olathe, Newport Beach and Palo 
Alto) do not.  The most probable explanation for why Escondido, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto 
have chosen mandatory CRPs (when our estimates suggest that their social net benefits are 
clearly negative) is that California has implemented a state-mandated recycling quota.  Which 
naturally provokes the question:  In the 20 or so states that have passed laws establishing 
mandatory recycling programs or quotas, how many communities are motivated by the recycling 
targets themselves rather than by locally-based economic rationalizations? 
 In sum, using our theoretical model and estimates of net social benefits, we have correctly 
predicted the choice of whether or not to implement a CRP for 8 of the 12 selected communities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
24 The recycling websites for Tempe and Palo Alto are www.tempe.gov/publicworks/fspage/curbside/crecycling.htm 
and www.cityofpaloalto.org/public-works/rec-index.html, respectively. 
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Furthermore, if Escondido, Newport Beach, and Palo Alto have in fact chosen mandatory CRPs 
in order to meet a state-mandated recycling quota, then we can explain all but one community’s 
(Olathe, KS) choice of whether or not to provide a CRP.               
 Next, we highlight the main shortcomings of our approach.  On the one hand, our mean WTP 
estimates may understate the social benefit of recycling if survey respondents are not fully 
internalizing the public benefits associated with recycling.  As mentioned in Section 2, we have 
assumed that households are “impurely altruistic”, in the sense that although they are motivated 
to recycle out of an “ethical responsibility to help the environment,” they may not be fully 
internalizing the effects of their recycling effort on the welfare of other households located in 
their community.  To the extent that each household values increased aggregate recycling, this 
may cause us to understate the social net benefit of recycling. 
 On the other hand, it is possible that we may be overstating the net benefits of curbside 
recycling.  The issue of how to account for implicit opportunity costs through discounting is 
hotly debated [Hanley and Spash, 1993].  We have tacitly assumed that the opportunity cost 
associated with diverting resources toward curbside recycling is the foregone interest income at 
the market interest rate, which in turn is assumed to equal the social discount rate.  As a result, 
discounting completely offsets any accumulated opportunity costs.  To the degree that the market 
interest rate (or rate of return on the next best alternative) exceeds the social discount rate, the 
social net benefit of recycling will be overstated.  
 In sum, despite the shortcomings mentioned above, this is the most comprehensive study to-
date of the social efficiency of curbside recycling.  The study covers approximately 20 western 
U.S. states, surveying over 4,000 households and recycling coordinators in 40 different 
communities.  The benefit measure generated from the household survey is carefully calibrated 
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for hypothetical bias by contrasting with the actual decisions of households residing in 
communities with voluntary CRPs.  The economic cost of providing curbside recycling services 
is estimated from direct interviews with the recycling coordinators from cities within our sample 
and from previous research compiled by the U.S. EPA and ISLR.  Remarkably, we find that, on 
average, the benefits and costs per household are almost exactly identical. 
 Although this finding lends scientific credibility to an often contentious national recycling 
debate, it does little to guide national opinion regarding the efficiency of municipal recycling 
programs.  At a local level, however, our research suggests that the public policy choices are 
often much more clear.  Cities with significantly positive net social benefits should be supporting 
curbside recycling programs while cities with significantly negative net social benefits should 
consider other waste management options.  Toward that end, our research provides local 
policymakers within our population of western U.S. states the additional tools necessary to 
decide whether to implement or maintain a CRP.  Local policymakers can obtain WTP estimates 
for their respective communities by substituting community and socio-demographic 
characteristics into the right-hand-side of our econometric equation (i.e., equation (2)).  Or, they 
might consider conducting their own surveys, in which case our survey design and econometric 
analysis might serve as a useful benchmark.  Finally, regardless of how they estimate the benefits 
associated with curbside recycling, policymakers in communities with existing CRPs should 
maintain detailed cost information for their programs, preferably disaggregated from general 
refuse funds, as is currently done in the cities of Portland, OR and Seattle, WA.  
A natural next step would be to extend our research to the eastern U.S. where the constraints 
on landfill space are more binding, and to obtain more precise CRP cost data across a wider 
variety of communities.  To accomplish this, more case studies of existing CRPs are required 
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(along the lines of ILSR, 1991; U.S. EPA, 1994; Hanley and Slark, 1994; SWANA, 1995; 
Franklin Associates, Ltd., 1997; and Kinnaman, 2000).  This would enable us to more accurately 
estimate the marginal and average costs of providing curbside recycling and to identify programs 
that are the most cost effective.  
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Figure 1.  CRP Conditions I and II. 
 
$/Month 
ATC 
AMS 
n n* 
τ V 
τ M 
A 
B C 
D 
E 
MC 
F 
G 
H # Households 
 31 
Table 1.  Costs per Household and Other Characteristics for CRPs 
City 
Cost ($) per 
Household 
per Month  
Number of 
Households  
Participating 
Percent of 
Households 
Participatingh 
Mandatory 
Program? 
Household 
Sorting 
Required? 
Tempe, AZ 1.62 38,000 60 Yes No 
Seattle, WAe 1.71 113,484 44 No Nof 
West Linn, ORe 2.21 4,956 61 No Yes 
Fargo, ND 2.68 1,452 4 No Yes 
Orem, UT 2.78b 5,400 23 No No 
Portland, ORc 2.89 139,431 62 Yes Yes 
Longmont, CO 3.03g 22,950 86 Yes No 
Escondido, CA 3.16b NA NA Yes No 
Newport Beach, CA 3.42 27,700 84 Yes No 
Olathe, KSa 3.58b 30,000 93 No Yes 
Palo Alto, CA 5.10d 25,216 100 Yes Yes 
Mean 2.93 40,859 61.7 --- --- 
Coefficient of Var. 0.33 1.15 0.50 --- --- 
Notes.  aBased on figures provided by Franklin Associates, Ltd., “Solid Waste Management at the Crossroads,” 
December 1997.  bSince the revenues from the sale of recyclable materials were unavailable, we used the average 
revenue (adjusted for location) across communities that reported revenue sales.  This amounted to $0.44 per 
household per month.  cBased on figures provided by Neal Johnson, Recycling Coordinator, December 2002.  
dIncludes once-a-month curbside collection of household hazardous waste and green waste.  eBased on figures 
provided by ILSR [1991].  fApproximately 56 percent of households (those located in the “north section” of the 
city) participate a commingled program, while the remaining 44 percent (located in the “south section”) 
participate in a non-sorting program.  gProcessing costs are inferred using Franklin Associates, Ltd. [1997] at 
$1.53 per household per month (after adjusting for location and inflation).  hLess than 100% participation in 
mandatory CRPs is common, since even though households are required to pay for the program they are typically  
under no obligation to actually participate.  NA means “not available”.   
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Table 2. Variable Definitions and Means 
Variables Mean Description 
Ethical Duty 0.87 Do you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the environment? 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Monetary 0.47 Are you motivated to recycle in order to save money?  1= yes, 0 = no. 
Primarily Ethics 0.56 Which most encourages your household to recycle?  1 = ethical duty, 0 = save money. 
Dropoff Distance 1.31 Distance in miles to the nearest dropoff site. 
Dropoff User 0.61 In the past 12 months has your household used dropoff recycling?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Young 0.32 1 if 18<Age<35, 0 otherwise. 
Old 0.12 1 if 65<Age, 0 otherwise. 
Male 0.40 1 = male, 0 = female. 
High School 0.13 Highest level of education in household?  1 = high school graduate, 0 = otherwise 
Associates 0.09 1 = associates degree, 0 = otherwise 
Bachelors 0.31 1 = bachelors degree, 0 = otherwise 
Masters 0.17 1 = masters degree, 0 = otherwise 
Ph.D. 0.08 1 = Ph.D. or equivalent professional degree, 0 = otherwise 
Household Size 1.09 Number of adults in household, other than the respondent. 
Environmental Org. 0.10 Anyone in your household belong to an environmental organization?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Med Income 0.35 1 if $35K/yr<Household Income<$75K/yr, 0 otherwise 
High Income 0.32 1 if $75K/yr<Household Income, 0 otherwise 
Employed 0.80 Adult with the highest income currently employed?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Retired 0.12 Adult with the highest income currently retired?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Short Cheap Talk 0.34 1 = received short cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise. 
Longer Cheap Talk 0.34 1 = received longer cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise. 
Sorting Required 0.41 1 = CRP requires some sorting of recyclable materials, 0 otherwise. 
Polite 0.10 1 if polite refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise. 
Angry 0.01 1 if angry refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise. 
Landfill Visit 0.53 Has anyone in your household visited your community’s landfill?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Landfill Distance 10.96 Distance to nearest landfill in miles. 
Landfill Distance > 2 
mi. 
6.89 Distance above and beyond 2 miles to nearest landfill, 0 otherwise. 
Hypothetical 0.47 1 = respondent valued a hypothetical CRP, 0 = otherwise. 
Precision 84.24 On a scale of 0-100, how certain are you of the answers to your WTP questions? 
English 0.98 Is English your first language?  1 = yes, 0 = no 
Employer Recycle 0.50 Do you recycle at work?  1 = yes, 0 = no 
Caucasian  0.78 What racial group best describes you?  1 = White or Caucasian, 0 otherwise 
Hispanic 
 
0.08 What racial group best describes you?  1 = Hispanic, 0 otherwise 
African American 0.03 What racial group best describes you?  1 = Black or African American, 0 otherwise 
Generation Link 0.38 Were you (or other adults in your house) raised in recycling households?  1 =yes, 0 = no 
Neighbor Recycle 0.39 Do most of your neighbors currently recycle? 1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Years in Community 15.80 How many years have you lived in your community? 
Number of Children 0.85 How many children under the age of 18 currently live in your home? 
Attempt 1 0.69 Respondent available for survey after first dialing attempt. 
Attempt 2 0.14 Respondent available for survey after second dialing attempt. 
Fee Known 0.49 Respondent offer answer to how much household pays for current CRP?  1 = yes, 0 = no 
Fee Difference 4.54 Stated CRP fee minus actual CRP fee. 
CRP Performance 0.89 Job performance of your current CRP?  1 = excellent or good, 0 = fair or poor 
Bid 5.51 Opening Bid  
Notes. The description does not always exactly match the wording in the survey instrument.  To see the exact wording and 
complete descriptive statistics for each variable, please refer to www.uwyo.edu/aadland/research/recycle/datareport.pdf.  
Further descriptions of the “Cheap Talk” variables can be found in Aadland and Caplan [2005].  In calculating the means, 
the relevant sample size is N = 4012.  However, due to the nature of some variables (e.g., Dropoff Distance and Primarily 
Ethics) the mean is calculated using only the relevant subsample of respondents. 
 33 
 
Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models 
Explanatory Variables† 
DBDC WTP Estimates 
Voluntary CRP 
Participation  
Probit Estimates 
Mandatory/No CRP 
Participation 
Probit Estimates 
Coefficient P –Value Coefficient P –Value Coefficient P –Value 
Ethical Duty 2.801*** 0.000 4.601*** 0.002 4.671*** 0.000 
Monetary 0.289 0.244 1.113 0.188 -0.817 0.211 
Primarily Ethics 1.147*** 0.000 1.265** 0.012 1.357*** 0.005 
Dropoff Distance 0.021 0.197 0.049 0.182 0.061 0.126 
Dropoff User -0.040 0.427 -0.333 0.245 -0.437 0.171 
Young 1.503*** 0.000 -1.126** 0.011 0.122 0.393 
Old -0.220 0.221 -0.415 0.270 -0.883* 0.084 
Male -0.566*** 0.000 -0.407 0.110 0.022 0.472 
High School 0.470 0.159 -0.539 0.360 1.372 0.130 
Some College 0.607* 0.100 -0.383 0.399 1.391 0.126 
Associates 0.232 0.322 0.253 0.435 1.783* 0.080 
Bachelors 0.775** 0.048 0.253 0.432 1.987* 0.053 
Masters 0.782* 0.052 0.703 0.323 2.464** 0.027 
Ph.D. 1.458*** 0.003 -0.036 0.491 2.300* 0.043 
Household Size 0.087 0.142 -0.023 0.451 0.052 0.378 
Environmental Organization  1.305*** 0.000 1.148** 0.022 1.545*** 0.004 
Med Income 0.007 0.487 0.255 0.307 0.107 0.406 
High Income 0.182 0.219 0.025 0.482 0.376 0.222 
Employed 3.610** 0.028 2.123** 0.012 0.288 0.347 
Retired 0.136 0.356 2.046** 0.019 1.417** 0.049 
English 0.770* 0.081 -1.836 0.175 -2.254* 0.079 
Caucasian 0.688*** 0.005 -0.315 0.293 -0.652 0.118 
Hispanic 0.202 0.291 -1.133 0.112 -1.122* 0.091 
African American 0.052 0.457 0.982 0.216 -0.141 0.448 
Generational Link 0.180 0.122 0.377 0.148 0.528* 0.058 
Neighbors Recycle -0.281 0.096 --- --- --- --- 
Number of Children -0.048 0.204 0.134 0.123 -0.028 0.401 
Call Attempt #1 -0.182 0.182 0.793** 0.034 0.822** 0.023 
Call Attempt #2 -0.477** 0.029 0.412 0.220 0.708* 0.079 
Years in Community -0.020*** 0.000 -0.011 0.205 -0.010 0.199 
Employer Recycle -0.017 0.464 0.185 0.336 0.924** 0.016 
Polite -0.689*** 0.002 -0.742** 0.050 -0.913** 0.025 
Angry -0.424 0.310 0.448 0.398 1.336 0.216 
Precision -0.013*** 0.000 -0.003 0.353 -0.008 0.118 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for WTP and Participation Models (continued) 
Fee Known -0.512*** 0.007 1.173*** 0.002 --- --- 
Fee Difference 0.070*** 0.000 -0.001 0.482 --- --- 
CRP Performance 1.339*** 0.000 --- --- --- --- 
Sorting Required -0.054 0.386 --- --- -1.127*** 0.006 
Landfill Visit 0.032 0.428 0.463 0.114 0.125 0.364 
Landfill Distance -1.750 0.115 1.135** 0.017 1.206*** 0.008 
Landfill Distance > 2 mi. 1.767 0.113 -1.208** 0.014 -1.317*** 0.006 
Short Cheap Talk 0.360** 0.018 2.023** 0.041 1.367** 0.042 
Longer Cheap Talk 0.700*** 0.000 2.737** 0.013 2.515*** 0.003 
CRP Community -1.135*** 0.000 --- --- --- --- 
Voluntary CRP Hypothetical Bias --- --- 2.306*** 0.006 --- --- 
Mandatory CRP Hypothetical Bias --- --- --- --- 2.720** 0.040 
No CRP Hypothetical Bias --- --- --- --- 2.957*** 0.000 
Hetero. 
Constant 1.797*** 0.000 0.937*** 0.066 2.106*** 0.000 
Bid 0.190*** 0.000 0.373*** 0.007 0.201** 0.027 
Voluntary SP --- --- 2.013*** 0.000 --- --- 
Mandatory SP --- --- --- --- 1.490** 0.011 
No CRP SP --- --- --- --- 1.192*** 0.003 
Sample Size 4012 1168 2114 
Likelihood Ratio Statistic 886.54*** 226.25*** 349.08*** 
Mean WTP 5.61 --- --- 
Calibrated Mean WTP 2.97 --- --- 
Notes.  (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively.  The estimation was 
carried out using the Constrained Maximum Likelihood (CML 2.0) package in Gauss version 3.5.  The nonlinear 
optimization routine was Newton-Raphson with a convergence criterion of 1×10-5 for the gradient of the coefficients.  The 
estimates for the constant terms, community dummy variables, as well as the dummy variables for “don’t know” and 
“missing responses” are not shown. †Although not explicitly listed as an explanatory variable, we control for BID in creating 
the probabilities that enter the likelihood function.  See Cameron and James [1987] for further details.   
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Table 4.  Calibrated WTP for Select Cities 
City CRP Type 
Raw WTP 
Estimate 
Hypothetical 
bias 
correction 
Sample vs. 
population 
correction 
Calibrated 
WTP 
Estimate 
Tempe, AZ M 7.89 -2.71 -0.06 5.12 
Longmont, CO M 7.52 -2.71 -0.05 4.75 
Orem, UT V 6.04 -2.31 +0.01 3.75 
Wichita, KS V 5.42 -2.31 +0.12 3.24 
Fargo, ND V 5.06 -2.31 +0.03 2.78 
Abilene, TX N 5.18 -2.96 +0.04 2.26 
Palo Alto, CA M 5.35 -2.71 -0.39 2.25 
Escondido, CA M 4.84 -2.71 +0.02 2.14 
Peoria, AZ N 5.13 -2.96 -0.05 2.13 
Olathe, KS V 4.41 -2.31 -0.11 1.99 
Inglewood, CA N 4.39 -2.96 +0.38 1.81 
Newport Beach, CA M 4.46 -2.71 -0.35 1.40 
Notes:   Mandatory and voluntary CRP cities were selected due to the availability of cost data.  Three representative 
non-CRP cities were chosen at random.  The correction for differences between the sample and population 
demographics includes the variables:  gender, age, education, household size, income, primary language and race.  
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Table 5.  City Comparisons of Net Benefits and Theoretical CRP Predictions 
City WTP  Cost Net Benefit (WTP-Cost) 
CRP 
Type CRP Predictions
 
Tempe, AZ 5.12 1.62 3.50 M CRP 
Longmont, CO 4.75 3.03 1.72 M CRP 
Orem, UT 3.75 2.78 0.97 V CRP  
Wichita, KS 3.24 2.93a 0.31 V CRP 
Fargo, ND 2.78 2.68 0.10 V CRP  
Abilene, TX 2.26 2.93a -0.67 N No CRP 
Peoria, AZ 2.13 2.93a -0.70 N No CRP 
Escondido, CA 2.14 3.16 -1.02 Mb No CRP 
Inglewood, CA 1.81 2.93a -1.12 N No CRP 
Olathe, KS 1.99 3.58 -1.59 V No CRP 
Newport Beach, CA 1.40 3.42 -2.02 Mb No CRP 
Palo Alto, CA 2.25 5.10 -2.85 Mb No CRP 
Notes:  (a) The overall mean cost estimate from Table 1.  (b) Theoretical prediction does not account for 
state-mandated recycling goals.    
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
